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INTRODUCTION
Formal agreements between landowners and local government
respecting the use of land have increased substantially over the past
twenty-five years. Such agreements change the relationship between
landowner and government in the land development process from
confrontation to some measure of cooperation. While there are sev-
eral kinds of such agreements (cooperative and housing agreements,
for example), only two link vesting land development fights with the
dedication and funding of public facilities: the annexation agreement
and the development agreement. The principal difference between
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the two (which is implied in their names) is that the annexation
agreement applies to land about to be annexed to a village, town, city,
or other general purpose municipal corporation, as opposed to a de-
velopment agreement where the land subject to the agreement is al-
ready a part of the municipal corporation. Otherwise, both the theory
and the principal reasons for negotiating such agreements are, with
one exception, the same. The landowner generally wishes to guaran-
tee that local government's land use regulations, conditions, and ex-
actions remain fixed during the life of a prospective land development
on the subject parcel. The local government, on the other hand, seeks
as many concessions and land development conditions as possible
beyond what it could reasonably require through subdivision exac-
tions, impact fees, and other conditions under the normal exercise of
its regulatory authority or police power.
The principal difference between the two types of agreement is
the benefit/burden of annexing the subject property to the local gov-
ernment's territory under an annexation agreement: The landowner
generally obtains a variety of services and protections as a part of the
local government's territorial jurisdiction but must subject itself to
that local government's land use regulations, as well as property and
other taxes. The local government obtains additional tax revenues
together with a larger tax base for general obligation borrowing but
must provide police, fire, and often utility services to its newly an-
nexed territory. Which side is the most advantaged or disadvantaged
depends, of course, on the circumstances of the annexation. A new
shopping center, for example, may be more attractive to a local gov-
ernment than a sprawling single-family residential project. Both will
require a level of municipal services, but the former will, in all likeli-
hood, generate more revenue (particularly if the local government
collects a sales or business tax) and require fewer services like parks
and schools.
The purpose of the development agreement, on the other hand, is
to vest certain development rights in the landowner/developer in ex-
change for construction and dedication of public improvements:
[D]evelopment agreements.. . between a developer and a lo-
cal government limit the power of that government to apply
newly enacted ordinances to ongoing developments. Unless
otherwise provided in the agreement, the rules, regulations,
and official policies governing permitted uses, density, de-
sign, improvement, and construction are those in effect when
the agreement is executed.1
1 City of West Hollywood v. Beverly Towers, 805 P.2d 329, 334 n.6 (Cal. 1991). The
court continued: "The purpose of ... the development agreement is to allow a developer who
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BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC FACILITIES
As it is legally difficult, if not impossible, for the land-
owner/developer to obtain enforceable assurances that land use regu-
lations will not change during the life of a major land development
project-particularly multi-phase development projects extending
over many years-and, as there are significant limits to what a local
government can exact as a price for permitting land development,
2
both parties, in theory, have adequate reason to negotiate such an
agreement. From a contractual perspective, there is adequate consid-
eration flowing to support such a bilateral agreement. This may be
particularly important given the frequent use of conditional zoning
whereby local government units reclassify property to permit more
intense development upon the promise of the developer to limit the
number of otherwise permitted uses in the new zone, and to do or
provide certain things which are memorialized in one or more unilat-
eral covenants deposited with the local government and recorded.
However, such covenants are generally devoid of any mutuality, and
local government actions to enforce them have often been unsuccess-
ful.3 Moreover, the recording of a unilateral covenant by the devel-
oper provides little assurance that the local government will maintain
the zoning for which the promises contained in the covenants were
made. Therefore, a bilateral agreement, particularly one sanctioned
by the state through enabling legislation reciting the public purpose
behind such agreement, is by far a more legally sound way to pro-
ceed.
This Article commences with an overview of the major problems
faced by government and landowners solved by the development
agreement. The balance of this Article is concerned with the prob-
lems-common to both types of agreements-of authority (generally
statutory) to enter into such agreements, bargaining away the police
power, and permissible subject matter of such agreements. Following
a discussion of these fundamental legal issues, this Article continues
with a discussion of more particular problems, such as comprehensive
plans conformity, character of the agreement (administrative or leg-
islative), and binding of other governmental agencies.
needs additional discretionary approvals to complete a long-term development project as ap-
proved, regardless of any intervening changes in local regulations." Id. at 334-35.
2 See Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy E. Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land
Development Linkage, 9 NOVA L.J. 381 (1985) (describing legal issues posed by "linkage"
programs, by which "local regulations ... condition the approval of certain types of land devel-
opment on the developer's agreement to contribute to certain other types of development that
further particular public purposes").
3 See Russell v. Palos Verdes Properties, 32 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)
("There is no claim that mutually enforceable restrictions were ever created, nor has there been
an attempt to enforce any restrictions as covenants running with the land or any rights arising
out of the unilateral declaration of restrictions .... [The unilateral declaration of restrictions..
. failed to create mutually enforceable restrictions ....").
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I. WHY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTEXT
Both developer and local government face substantive constitu-
tional issues in the land development approval process. Local gov-
ernments are unable to exact dedications of land or fees of the "im-
pact" or "in lieu" variety without establishing a clear connection or
nexus between the proposed development and the dedication or fee.4
The developer is unable to "vest" or guarantee a right to proceed with
a project until that project is commenced.5
A. Local Government's Problem: Unconstitutional Conditions
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,6 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of conditions on land development permissions.
Holding that the Commission's requirement of a lateral beach-access
dedication was an unconstitutional condition on the issuance of a
building permit to reconstruct a beach house, the Court stated:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that
people already on the public beaches be able to walk across
the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the
beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to un-
derstand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using
the public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional
congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans'
new house. We therefore find that the Commission's impo-
sition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise
7of its land-use power for any of these purposes.
However, the Court concluded that it would be an altogether dif-
ferent matter if an "essential nexus" exists between the condition and
the landowner's proposed use of the property:
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some
condition that would have protected the public's ability to see
4 See Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65
N.C. L. REv. 957, 1017-20 (1987) (describing the "rational nexus" test adopted by a majority of
jurisdictions to assess the reasonableness of provisions requiring exactions of property in devel-
opment agreements, and the expansion of the doctrine governing exactions to address the use of
"impact fees"), reprinted in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY
TAKINGS AFrER DoL4N AND LucAs 17 (David L. Callies ed., 1996).
5 See John J. Delaney, Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology: A Gaping
Disconnect?, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 603, 607-08 (2000) (noting that many states require
action such as construction or expenditure of funds in reliance on a development permit for the
permit to be valid).
6 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
7 Id. at 838-39.
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the beach notwithstanding construction of the new house-
for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban
on fences-so long as the Commission could have exercised
its police power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid con-
struction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition
would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come
closer to the facts of the present case), the condition would be
constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the
Noilans provide a viewing spot on their property for
passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house
would interfere....
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, how-
ever, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the
prohibition.... [T]he lack of nexus between the condition
and the original purpose of the building restriction converts
that purpose to something other than what it was. The pur-
pose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an ease-
ment to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without
payment of compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits
of "legitimate state interests" in the takings and land-use
context, this is not one of them.8
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,9 the Supreme Court struck down a
municipal building permit condition requiring that the landowner
dedicate bike-path and greenway/floodplain easements to the city.10
As the Court pointed out, had Tigard simply required such dedica-
tions, it would be required to pay compensation under the Fifth
Amendment." Attaching them as building permit conditions required
a more sophisticated analysis, closely following Nollan,12 because the
police power is implicated rather than the power of eminent domain.
In the process, the Court signaled how far local government may go
in passing on the cost of public facilities to landowners. The answer:
only to the extent that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development.
8 id. at 836-37.
9 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
'o See id. at 379-80 ("[The City Planning Commission] required that petitioner dedicate
the portion of her property lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm
drainage system ... and that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the
floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.").
" See id. at 384 ("Without question, had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a
strip of land... for public use, rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her
property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred.").
12 See generally Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUm. L. REv. 473 (1991), for a suggestion on
how this decision radically affected the law.
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The Court essentially adopted a three-part test: (1) Does the
permit condition seek to promote a legitimate state interest? (2) Does
an essential nexus exist between the legitimate state interest and the
permit condition? and (3) does a required degree of connection exist
between the exactions and the projected impact of the development? 3
The Court disposed of the first two parts quickly and affirma-
tively. Certainly, the prevention of flooding along the creek and the
reduction of traffic in the business district "qualify as the type of le-
gitimate public purposes [the Court has] upheld."14 Moreover, the
Court held it was "equally obvious" that a nexus exists between pre-
venting flooding and limiting development within the creek's flood-
plain, and that "[t]he same may be said for the city's attempt to re-
duce traffic congestion by providing for alternative means of trans-
portation ... [like] a pedestrian/bicycle pathway."' 5 So far, so good;
the Court found both a public purpose, which the Court assumed
without deciding in Nollan, and an essential nexus, which the Court
decided was lacking in Nollan. Regarding the third part of the test, a
question remained about whether "the degree of the exactions de-
manded by the city's permit conditions bears the required relationship
to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed development."16
The Court said no-the city's "tentative findings" concerning in-
creased stormwater flow from the more intensively developed prop-
erty, together with its statement that such development was "antici-
pated to generate additional vehicular traffic thereby increasing con-
gestion" on nearby streets, were simply not "constitutionally suffi-
cient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on petitioner's
building permit."17
Many courts have applied the nexus/proportionality tests set out
in Nollan and Dolan.18 The Eighth Circuit in Christopher Lake De-
velopment Co. v. St. Louis County,19 for example, applied Dolan to
strike down a county drainage-system requirement.20 The county had
granted preliminary development approval for two residential com-
munities on the condition that the landowner provide a drainage sys-
13 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384-86 (describing the analytical structure applicable to imposi-
tions of permit conditions upon landowners).
14 Id. at 387 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980)).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 388.
17 Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
18 See David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on
Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts
Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 567-74 (1999) (discussing several cases applying
the nexus/proportionality tests).
'9 35 F.3d 1269 (8th Cir. 1994).
20 See id. at 1274-75 (reversing the district court's order dismissing the landowner's
claims for lack of ripeness).
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tern for an entire watershed.2' The court first addressed part one of
the Dolan test: whether the condition promoted a legitimate state in-
terest.22 The court stated that "even assuming the legitimacy of the
County's purpose in requiring a drainage system, the application of
the Criteria may violate the equal protection clause. 23 Citing Nollan
for the nexus or second part of the test, the court reasoned that, al-
though "the County's objective to prevent flooding may be rational, it
may not be rational to single out the Partnership to provide the entire
drainage system."24 The court concluded that such a requirement was
disproportionate to the drainage problems that would be caused by the
proposed development:
[F]rom our review of the record, the County has forced
the Partnership to bear a burden that should fairly have been
allocated throughout the entire watershed area. "A strong
public desire to improve the public condition will not warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change."
Regarding a remedy, the court concluded: "We believe that the
Partnership is entitled to recoup the portion of its expenditures in ex-
cess of its pro rata share and remand to the district court to determine
the details and amounts. 26
B. The Landowner's Problem: Vested Rights
Private-sector need for a mechanism to guarantee the continued
applicability of existing (or new) land development regulations to a
particular project grew from dissatisfaction with cases deciding the
vesting point at which a landowner's right to proceed with a project,
legal when conceptualized or commenced, could continue in the face
of changed regulations prohibiting such development. Rooted in the
concept of nonconformities, this concept of "vested rights" is vari-
ously interpreted throughout the United States to provide that devel-
opers are guaranteed to proceed with such developments after a sim-
ple rezoning at one extreme to only after the issuance of a building
permit at the other extreme.27 It is holdings in the latter category that
2, See id. at 1270-71.
2 See id. at 1274 (noting that, because no fundamental right or suspect classification was
involved, the government's decision need only be rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est).
2 id.
24 id.
2 Id. at 1275 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994)).
26id
27 See CHARLES L SIEMON ET AL, VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS 8-9 (1982) ("The law of vested rights is generally regarded as
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prompted vested fights bills to be drafted in two of the thirteen states
with full-blown vested fights/development agreements statutes-Cali-
fornia and Hawaii.
In California, the first state to pass such a bill, Avco Community
Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission28 spurred the
development community into seeking legislative relief. Despite the
expenditure of nearly three million dollars and the rough grading of
seventy-four acres, the California Supreme Court ruled that a permit
from a newly created agency under new coastal protection statutes
was necessary before Avco's fights to continue developing vested.
Thus, development fights did not vest until the issuance of a building
permit, even though developers incurred substantial costs prior to the
issuing of such a permit. Since the passage of the California vested
fights statute in 1980, implementation has been rapid. According to
one commentator, over half the local governments in California have
negotiated nearly 700 agreements since 1980.29 The development
agreement appears to be used by cities of all sizes, and for sin-
gle-stage and multi-stage projects alike, though predictably the num-
ber of such agreements is largest in the larger California cities.30
In Hawaii, the second state to pass a development agreements
statute (modeled extensively after the California bill), the bill was
spawned by County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Insurance
Co.,31 colloquially known as the Nukolii case after the beach upon
which a proposed hotel and condominium apartment building was to
be constructed. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that fights to de-
velop did not vest until the last discretionary permit was issued. In
this case, that last discretionary permit was the holding of a referen-
dum on the applicable beach zoning, since the petition for the placing
of rezoning on the ballot was certified before shoreland management
permits-normally the last discretionary permits in the land develop-
ment process in the County of Kauai at that time-were granted.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT SOLUTION
The development agreement offers a solution to both land-
owner/developer and local government. Often authorized by statute
to help avoid reserved power and Contract Clause problems discussed
below, a well-structured agreement can be drafted to deal with a vari-
involving two rules or standards-vested rights or 'vesting' and equitable or 'zoning' estop-
pel.").
2 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976).
29 Cf. Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in
California and Other States, 22 STETSON L. REv. 761,766 (1993) ("[Sleven states have enacted
development agreement legislation and ... hundreds of development agreements have been
adopted .... ").
30 Cf. id.
3' 653 P.2d 766 (Haw. 1982).
[Vol. 51:663
BARGAINING FOR PUBLIC FACILITIES
ety of common issues which arise in the land development process
between landowner and local government.
A. Bargaining Away the Police Power and Reserved Power
The first issue is whether the local government has bargained
away its police power by entering into an agreement under which it
promises not to change its land use regulations during the life of the
agreement. This issue is resolved in the same way for both annexa-
tion and development agreements. Specific statutory authorization is
helpful so as to make clear that these agreements effectuate a public
purpose recognized by the state. Oddly, while thirteen states have so
far adopted legislation enabling local governments to enter into de-
velopment agreements with landowner/developers,32 only six states
appear to have so authorized annexation agreements.33 Apparently,
the prevalence of statutory annexation provisions, together with a
recognition that local governments have the powers they need to ex-
ercise their authorized powers (such as annexation), has convinced
most courts considering the matter to uphold the annexation agree-
ment in the absence of enabling statutes. An example is California,
where a court of appeals held that the statutory sources of a city's
authority to discharge its annexation and sewage functions, while not
expressly vesting it with the authority to contract for either purpose
by means of an annexation agreement, have that effect by necessary
implication: "'[A] city has authority to enter into contracts which en-
able it to carry out its necessary functions, and this applies to powers
expressly conferred upon a-municipality [and to] powers implied by
necessity.
'''4
32 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000) (amended 1997);
CAL GOV'T CODE § 65864 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-101 to -106 (2000); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 163.3220 (West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-123 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 67-
6511A (1995 & Supp. 2000) (amended 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4780.22 (West 1988
& Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.0201 (1997); N.L STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-45.2 (West
1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.504 (1999) (enacted into law in 1993 by the Legislative Authority
but not made a part of the Oregon Revised Statutes until much later); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-31-10
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2303.1 (Michie 1997) (applies only to coun-
ties with a population between 10,300 and 11,000 and developments consisting of more than
1000 acres); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70B.170 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
33 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.05 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000) (amended 1997);
CAL GOV'T CODE § 65864 (West 1997); 65 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 414.0325 (West 1987 & Supp. 2001) (amended 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
160A-58.21 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70B.170 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000).
3 Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (quoting Carruth v. City of Madera, 43 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860 (Cal. CL App. 1965)).
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1. "Freezing" and the "Contracting Away" Issue
It is black letter law that local governments may not contract
away the police power,35 particularly in the context of zoning deci-
sions.36 Stated another way, government cannot bind itself to not ex-
ercise its police powers. It is thus considered to be against public
policy to permit the bargaining of zoning and subdivision regulations
for agreements and stipulations on the part of developers to do or re-
frain from doing certain things. Because land use and development
regulations represent exercises of police power, a development or an-
nexation agreement binding a local government not to exercise these
regulatory powers arguably violates the reserved powers doctrine,37
and is, therefore, ultra vires.
Under this doctrine, bargaining away the police power is the
equivalent of a current legislature attempting to exercise legislative
power reserved to later legislatures.38 However, an analysis of the
cases indicates that what the courts generally inveigh against is such
bargaining away forever, or at least for a very long time. The source
of the doctrine, Corporation of the Brick Presbyterian Church v.
Mayor of New York, involved the municipal abrogation of a lease
executed over fifty years before. While some later cases do involve
invalidation of municipal action just a few years old,n° the majority
35 See Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. 1982) (noting that "indi-
viduals cannot, by contract, abridge police powers which protect the general welfare and public
interest").
36 See Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249, 251-52 (1I1. App. Ct. 1972) (void-
ing restrictive covenant and rezoning ordinance because the law "condemns the practice of
regulating zoning through agreements or contracts between the zoning authorities and property
owners"); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Auto. Prods. Credit Ass'n, 87 A.2d 319, 322 (N.J. 1952)
("Contracts thus have no place in a zoning plan and a contract between a municipality and a
property owner should not enter into the enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations."); V.
F. Zahodiakin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 1952) ("Zon-
ing is an exercise of the police power to serve the common good and general welfare. It is ele-
mentary that the legislative function may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its exer-
cise controlled by the considerations which enter into the law of contracts.").
37 See, e.g., Robert M. Kessler, The Development Agreement and Its Use in Resolving
Large Scale, Multi-Party Development Problems: A Look at the Tool and Suggestions for Its
Application, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 464-469 (1985) (discussing the reserved powers
doctrine and the inability of local governments to contract away police powers); Bruce M.
Kramer, Development Agreements: To What Extent Are They Enforceable?, 10 REAL EST. UJ.
29, 37-45 (1981) (discussing the history and current viability of the reserved powers doctrine in
the context of development agreements).
38 See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817-18 (1880) (noting that "no legislature can
curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper in matters of
police"); Corporation of the Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New York, 5 Cow. 538, 542
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (noting that local governments have "no power to limit their legislative
discretion by covenant"), discussed in Kramer, supra note 37, at 37-39.
39 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
40 See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89-90 (Fla. 1956) (affirming lower court's
permanent injunction of a proposed revision of a zoning ordinance that had not yet taken effect);
V. F. Zahodiakin, 86 A.2d at 131-32 (affirming lower court's invalidation of a decision made
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deals with behavior further back in time. The dominant view is that
development agreements, drafted to reserve some governmental con-
trol over the agreement, do not contract away the police power, but
rather constitute a valid present exercise of that power. Good analo-
gous authority exists for the premise.
4 1
A subsidiary question under the reserved powers doctrine is
whether a city council, in exercising its power to contract, can make a
contract that binds its successors? In Carruth v. City of Madera,42 the
City contended that obligations under an annexation agreement exe-
cuted by a predecessor council were invalid because they deprived the
successor city council of the power to determine city policy and act in
the public interest. The court, however, held that the city was bound,
and that a contract was made by the council or other governing body
of a municipality and was fair, just, and reasonable at the time of its
execution. The court concluded that the contract was neither void nor
voidable merely because some of its executory features may operate
to bind a successor council.
43
One of the clearest rejections of the application of reserved
power and bargaining away the police power comes from the wide-
ranging Nebraska Supreme Court opinion upholding development
agreements in Giger v. City of Omaha.44 The objectors to the agree-
ment claimed that development agreements were a form of contract
zoning and, therefore, illegal on their face. The Nebraska Supreme
Court, however, preferred to characterize such agreements as a form
of conditional zoning that actually increased the city's police power,
rather than lessened it, by permitting more restrictive zoning (attach-
ing conditions through agreement) than a simple Euclidean rezonm
to a district in which a variety of uses would be permitted of right.
ten years earlier by the local board of adjustment that purported to grant a "variance" from zon-
ing requirements).
41 See, e.g., Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 202 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the effect of the general rule is to void only a contract which
amounts to a city's "surrender" or "abnegation" of its control of a properly municipal function,
and that the city's reservations of control over the land subject to an annexation agreement, as
well as the "just, reasonable, fair and equitable" nature of the agreement, rendered the agree-
ment valid and enforceable against the city).
42 43 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965).
43 See id. at 860-61; see also Denio v. City of Huntington Beach, 140 P.2d 392, 397 (Cal.
1943) (holding that a "fair, just, and reasonable" contract entered into by a governing body of a
municipality "is neither void nor voidable merely because some of its executory features may
extend beyond the terms of office of the members of [the governing] body"), overruled by Fra-
casse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
44 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989).
45 See id. at 192. The court reasoned:
In sum, we find that there is not clear and satisfactory evidence to support the ap-
pellants' contention that the city has bargained away its police power. The evidence
clearly shows that the city's police powers are not abridged in any manner and that
the agreement is expressly subject to the remedies available to the city under the
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Similarly, a recent California appeals court squarely upheld a devel-
opment agreement that was challenged directly on "surrender of po-
lice power" grounds, holding that a "zoning freeze in the Agreement
is not ... a surrender or abnegation [of the police power]. ' '46 The
court held that the freeze advanced the public interest and did not
contract away the police power.47
Annexation agreement cases are largely in accord.48 Thus,
where a foreign corporation attempted to disconnect its territory from
the City of Greenwood Village, Colorado, in part on the ground that
the annexation agreement under which the property was first annexed
inhibited the city's future zoning power, the federal district court held
that "preannexation agreements which impose certain zoning classifi-
cations as conditions of annexation have been upheld as valid and
enforceable" in Colorado. 49 The court found that Greenwood Vil-
lage's zoning fell into that category. To the same effect are several
state court decisions upholding annexation agreements restricting a
local government's power to later change zoning that was granted and
guaranteed during the life of the agreement.5°
Omaha Municipal Code. Further, we find that the agreement actually enhances the
city's regulatory control over the development rather than limiting it.
Id.
46 Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
47 See id. ("[T]he zoning freeze in the Agreement advances the public interest by pre-
serving future options. This type of action ... is more accurately described as a legitimate
exercise of governmental police power in the public interest than as a surrender of police power
to a special interest.").
48 See, e.g., Village of Orland Park v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 481 N.E.2d 946 (1i.
App. Ct. 1985). In this excellent example from Illinois, a bank attempted to avoid obligations
contained in an annexation agreement executed pursuant to the statutory authority contained in
that state's preannexation agreement statute. Noting that the bank's cited authority involved
agreements which proceeded without statutory authority, the Illinois Appellate Court observed:
The authorization of preannexation agreements by statute.., serves to further im-
portant governmental purposes, such as the encouragement of expanding urban areas
and to do so uniformly, economically, efficiently and fairly, with optimum provi-
sions made for the establishment of land use controls and necessary municipal im-
provements including streets, water, sewer systems, schools, parks, and similar in-
stallations. This approach also discourages fragmentation and proliferation of spe-
cial districts. Additional positive effects of such agreements include controls over
health, sanitation, fire prevention and police protection, which are vital to governing
communities.
Id. at 950.
49 Geralnes B.V. v. City of Greenwood Village, 583 F. Supp. 830, 839 (D. Colo. 1984).
- See, e.g., Union Nat'l Bank v. Village of Glenwood, 348 N.E.2d 226 (ill. App. Ct.
1976) (upholding preannexation agreement requiring single family residential zoning); French
v. Village of Lincolnshire, 335 N.E.2d 29 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (upholding preannexation agree-
ment that was subject to implied condition that a particular tract of land be used for a public
park and zoned accordingly); Mayor of Rockville v. Brookeville Turnpike Constr. Co., 228
A.2d 263 (Md. 1967) (upholding annexation agreement between city and developer that in-
cluded agreed-upon zoning classification); Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 206 A.2d 678 (Md.
1965) (upholding annexation agreement that was conditional upon zoning that would allow
construction of a shopping center). Moreover, two California superior court cases where devel-
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A California case considering a different type of agreement also
supports the proposition that agreeing to "freeze" certain land use
regulations or agreeing to approve certain land development projects
does not constitute bargaining away the police power. In Stephens v.
City of Vista,5' the city reneged on a settlement agreement providing
for a specific plan and zoning for the subject property and permitting
construction at an agreed-upon maximum density. Although the city
did rezone the property pursuant to the agreement, it failed to approve
a site development plan, in part to force the developer to reduce the
development density. The city argued that it had unlawfully con-
tracted away its police power in the agreement. Citing the Morrison
Homes annexation agreement case,52 the court held that while a city
cannot generally contract away its legislative and governmental func-
tions, the rule applies only where a city surrenders control of its func-
tions.53 Here, the city could still exercise discretion over the site de-
velopment process, even though it had guaranteed density and zoning.
The court awarded damages based on the difference between the
value of the property with 140 units (as permitted in the agreement)
and with only fifty-five units (zoning contrary to the settlement
agreement), or $727,500.54
For a contrary, if somewhat dated, position, see the long dissent
by Justice Moore of Colorado in City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty
Hawk Development Co. 55 Where a corporate subdivision developer
sued to recover payment to Colorado Springs for the acquisition of
public parks made under an annexation agreement, the majority held
that since the developer had obtained water and sewer services for its
development under the agreement, as well as annexation to the city, it
could not now seek to set aside the agreement. Opining that "the
majority opinion amounts to the longest and most dangerous step yet
taken by this court in the general direction of emasculation and de-
opment agreements figure prominently support their use although the validity of the agreements
were not squarely at issue in either case. See Lincoln Property Co. v. City of Torrance, No.
C607339 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 1986); Continental Dev. Corp. v. Hart, No.
C617808 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 1986). The Lincoln Property court said, in dicta:
[1]f the city sought to impose requirements inconsistent or in conflict with the De-
velopment Agreement, it would violate rights, possessed by Lincoln, which are both
vested and fundamental [but] ... the rejection of underground parking, the require-
ment of 'for sale' condominiums and concern about aesthetics and landscaping are
not inconsistent or in conflict with the Development Agreement... vested rights are
not at issue.
Lincoln Property, No. C607339, slip op. at 3.
51 994 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1993).
52 Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
53 See Stephens, 994 F.2d at 655 ("[T]he rule [that a municipality may not contract away
its legislative and governmental functions] applies to void only a contract which amounts to a
city's 'surrender,' or 'abnegation,' of its control of a properly municipal function.").
54 See id. at 657.
55 392 P.2d 467,473-84 (Colo. 1964) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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struction of property rights, 56 the dissent suggests that annexation
agreements cannot require of a landowner that which the city could
not constitutionally exact under the police power if the subject terri-
tory were already within the city's jurisdiction, even if that exaction is
a tradeoff for that which the developer seeks, such as the discretion-
ary annexation of its land. Presumably, the dissent would take the
same view concerning such a tradeoff for local government freezing
of land development regulations under a development agreement.
This is decidedly a minority view today. What informed commentary
there has been on the various statutes appears to agree that, especially
if there is supporting state legislation, courts should have little diffi-
culty in supporting development agreements and annexation agree-
ments against any reserved powers/bargaining away the police power
argument.
57
In sum, the current application of the reserved powers clause to
abrogate government/private contracts has been rare, and courts have
attempted to find other grounds to uphold those contracts which are
fair, just, reasonable, and advantageous to the local government. 58 It
is unlikely that courts will fall back on the reserved powers clause to
invalidate development agreements passed pursuant to state statute,
especially if the agreements have a fixed termination date and that
date is not decades away.
59
36 Id. at 473.
57 See DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CURTIN'S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW
188-91 (17th ed. 1997); LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS §§ 2.1-
2.14 (1980) (discussing the possibility that development agreements may "contract away" the
police power and citing relevant California cases); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§
6.21-6.22 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing statutes and development agreements, and illustrating with
California law); 3 C. DALLAS SANDS ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 16.55 (1997) (dis-
cussing how little trouble courts have found with development agreements and citing cases in
support); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS AND VESTED RIGHTS: AN
UPDATE (1983) (collecting commentaries on the history and validity of development agree-
ments); Donald G. Hagman, Development Agreements, 3 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 65, 73-78
(1980) (discussing the enforceability of development agreements and the "contracting away" of
the police power); William G. Holliman, Jr., Development Agreements and Vested Rights in
California, 13 URB. LAW. 44, 53 (1981) (noting that many California courts have upheld "de-
velopment agreements in the face of contentions that they were invalid attempts to contract
away the legislative power"); Kessler, supra note 37, at 469-70 ("If it is a matter of state policy
to allow development agreements, the courts are more likely to defer to the legislature's discre-
tion and uphold the agreements against constitutional challenges."); Kramer, supra note 37, at
47-51 (criticizing the upholding of such annexation and development agreements).
58 See, e.g., Carruth v. City of Madera, 43 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)
(holding contract entered into by city can be enforced, even if it extends beyond the legislative
term, if the contract is fair, just, reasonable, and advantageous to the city); see also Kramer,
supra note 37, at 41 (discussing Carruth).
59 See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1993) (restricting the term of
any annexation agreement to twenty years).
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2. The Contracts Clause and Reserved Powers
It is also arguable that the Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution provides protection for development and annexation
agreements in the face of a reserved power challenge: "No State shall
... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. 60 Al-
though statutorily defined as either a legislative or administrative act,
a development agreement will be treated as a contract "when the lan-
guage and circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private
rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State. 61
Once the parties enter into a development agreement, strict ap-
plication of the Contracts Clause would prohibit government from
passing any law or regulation that would subsequently impair the re-
sulting contractual obligations. Further, any such act would be un-
constitutional, notwithstanding the fact that the new regulation may
be required by a genuine health, safety, or welfare crisis. Certainly,
this result would not be tolerated, and, therefore, one must conclude
that if a development agreement, subject to the Contracts Clause, ir-
revocably binds government to not exercise its police power in pro-
motion of the public interest, then the agreement violates the reserved
powers doctrine and is ultra vires.
The limitation of the Contracts Clause is, however, neither literal
nor absolute.62 The Supreme Court has held that the Contracts Clause
limitation cannot operate to eclipse or eliminate "'essential attributes
of sovereign power' . . . necessarily reserved by the States to safe-
guard the welfare of their citizens."'6 The test in United States Trust
Co., as refined in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus,64 ultimately
requires a balancing of the exercise of the police power against the
impairment resulting from the exercise of such police power. The
decisions suggest that any exercise of the police power that impairs
any obligations under a development agreement would be subject to
strict scrutiny, and, therefore, must be justifiable as an act "reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose." 65 Just what con-
stitutes an "important public purpose" sufficient to justify the im-
60 U.S. CONST. art. L § 10, cl. 1.
61 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977). For a full discus-
sion, see Wegner, supra note 4, at 995-1003 (making the case that although writers have simply
assumed that development agreements are contractual in nature, it would be more correct to
characterize development agreements as possessing a hybrid contractual-regulatory nature).
62 See Eric Sigg, California's Development Agreement Statute, 15 Sw. U. L. REv. 695,
720-22 (1985) (discussing tension between the Contracts Clause and the "reserved powers"
doctrine, and describing various tests to determine whether a particular contract surrenders an
essential attribute of a state's sovereignty).
6 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 21 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398,435 (1934)).
6' 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
6 United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25.
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pairment of contract obligations is a factual determination. In United
States Trust Co., bondholders' security interests outweighed the
state's interest in pollution control, rapid transit, and resource conser-
vation. Similarly, in Allied Structural Steel, the state's interest in
protecting its citizens' pensions failed to prevail over a private com-
pany's rights in its own pension plan.66
B. Statutory Authority: Critical for Development Agreements,
Helpfulfor Annexation Agreements
Courts that condemn zoning by agreement inveigh against the
abridgment of powers protecting the general welfare and the "barter-
ing... [of] legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing
on the merits of the requested amendment."67 This makes statutory
authority important, if not critical. Indeed, an Iowa court held that a
city's promise to later widen a street and construct a sidewalk
amounted to an illegal contract to perform a governmental function in
the future.6 8 This it could not do without statutory authority. The
court opined that the same reasoning would also apply to the city's
exercise of its police power.
66 For a thorough discussion of the United States Trust Co.-Alied Structural Steel Co.
test, see Anthony v. Kualoa Ranch, Inc., 736 P.2d 55 (Haw. 1987), in which the Hawaii Su-
preme Court applied the Contracts Clause doctrine to strike down a state statute requiring land-
lords to pay for leasehold improvements, at the tenant's option, as an unconstitutional impair-
ment of contractual rights. See also Quality Refrigerated Serv., Inc. v. City of Spencer, 908 F.
Supp. 1471 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (granting city's motion to dismiss, in part because plaintiff failed
to state a cause of action under the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution where it failed to
show that city zoning ordinance substantially impaired a contractual relationship, or that legiti-
mate government interests would not justify such an impairment if it existed); Holliman, supra
note 57, at 52-53 (concluding that "United States Trust and Allied Structural Steel suggest that
any subsequent exercise of the police power which impairs the obligations under a development
agreement would be subjected to a strict scrutiny test for reasonableness and necessity");
Kramer, supra note 37, at 35 (concluding that "[s]ubsequent legislative action seeking to amend,
modify, or repeal [a] development agreement would undoubtedly impair the obligation of the
contract and if less onerous alternatives were available to the legislature to achieve the same
policy goals they would have to be taken"); Sigg, supra note 62, at 720-22 (concluding "it
would appear that impairment by a city or county of its own development agreement would
have to survive the heightened scrutiny of a 'reasonable and necessary to serve important state
purposes' test"). For an exhaustive discussion of the reserved powers doctrine and its applica-
bility to local government contracts (and its Contract Clause limitations), see Janice C. Griffith,
Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L
REV. 277 (1990).
67 Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 250 N.E.2d 791,796 (111. App. Ct. 1969).
68 See Marco Dev. Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1991) (holding
that the same limitation that prohibits a legislature from binding successive legislative bodies
applies to a legislature's grant to a city, through a home-rule amendment to the state constitu-
tion, of "the power to contract for the exercise of its governmental or legislative authority").
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1. Protection of General Welfare
The first issue-protection of the general welfare-is probably
disposed of by strongpublic purpose-serving language. California, 9
Florida,70 and Hawaii all have such language in their development
agreement statutes.
69 The California code provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that:
(a) The lack of certainty in the approval of development projects can result in a
waste of resources, escalate the cost of housing and other development to the con-
sumer, and discourage investment in and commitment to comprehensive planning
which would make maximum efficient utilization of resources at the least economic
cost to the public.
(b) Assurance to the applicant for a development project that upon approval of the
project, the applicant may proceed with the project in accordance with existing poli-
cies, rules and regulations, and subject to conditions of approval, will strengthen the
public planning process, encourage private participation in comprehensive planning,
and reduce the economic costs of development.
(c) The lack of public facilities, including, but not limited to, streets, sewerage,
transportation, drinking water, school, and utility facilities, is a serious impediment
to the development of new housing. Whenever possible, applicants and local gov-
ernments may include provisions in agreements whereby applicants are reimbursed
over time for financing public facilities.
CAL. GoV'T CODE § 65864 (West 1997).
70 The Florida code provides:
(2) The Legislature finds and declares that:
(a) The lack of certainty in the approval of development can result in a waste of eco-
nomic and land resources, discourage sound capital improvement planning and fi-
nancing, escalate the cost of housing and development, and discourage commitment
to comprehensive planning.
(b) Assurance to a developer that upon receipt of his or her development permit or
brownfield designation he or she may proceed in accordance with existing laws and
policies, subject to the conditions of a development agreement, strengthens the pub-
lic planning process, encourages sound capital improvement planning and financing,
assists in assuring there are adequate capital facilities for the development, encour-
ages private participation in comprehensive planning, and reduces the economic
costs of development.
(3) In conformity with, in furtherance of, and to implement the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act and the Florida
State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972, it is the intent of the Legislature to en-
courage a stronger commitment to comprehensive and capital facilities planning, en-
sure the provision of adequate public facilities for development, encourage the effi-
cient use of resources, and reduce the economic cost of development.
(4) This intent is effected by authorizing local governments to enter into develop-
ment agreements with developers, subject to the procedures and requirements of ss.
163.3220-163.3243.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3220 (West 2000).
71 The Hawaii code provides:
Findings and purpose. The legislature finds that with land use laws taking on
refinements that make the development of land complex, time consuming, and re-
quiring advance financial commitments, the development approval process involves
the expenditure of considerable sums of money. Generally speaking, the larger the
project contemplated, the greater the expenses and the more time involved in com-
plying with the conditions precedent to filing for a building permit.
The lack of certainty in the development approval process can result in a
waste of resources, escalate the cost of housing and other development to the con-
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2. Requirements
As to the bartering away of unrelated (to land use) emoluments,
a well-drafted statute generally limits such agreements to specific
land use matters, with a catch-all for related matters. Florida's devel-
opment agreement statute contains such language.72 What the statutes
sumer, and discourage investment in and commitment to comprehensive planning.
Predictability would encourage maximum efficient utilization of resources at the
least economic cost to the public.
Public benefits derived from development agreements may include, but are
not limited to, affordable housing, design standards, and on- and off-site infrastruc-
ture and other improvements. Such benefits may be negotiated for in return for the
vesting of development rights for a specific period.
Under appropriate circumstances, development agreements could strengthen
the public planning process, encourage private and public participation in the com-
prehensive planning process, reduce the economic cost of development, allow for
the orderly planning of public facilities and services and the allocation of cost. As
an administrative act, development agreements will provide assurances to the appli-
cant for a particular development project, that upon approval of the project, the ap-
plicant may proceed with the project in accordance with all applicable statutes, ordi-
nances, resolutions, rules, and policies in existence at the time the development
agreement is executed and that the project will not be restricted or prohibited by the
county's subsequent enactment or adoption of laws, ordinances, resolutions, rules, or
policies.
Development agreements will encourage the vesting of property rights by
protecting such rights from the effect of subsequently enacted county legislation
which may conflict with any term or provision of the development agreement or in
any way hinder, restrict, or prevent the development of the project. Development
agreements are intended to provide a reasonable certainty as to the lawful require-
ments that must be met in protecting vested property rights, while maintaining the
authority and duty of government to enact and enforce laws which promote the pub-
lic safety, health, and general welfare of the citizens of our State. The purpose of
this part is to provide a means by which an individual may be assured at a specific
point in time that having met or having agreed to meet all of the terms and condi-
tions of the development agreement, the individual's rights to develop a property in
a certain manner shall be vested.
HAw. REV. STAT. § 46-121 (1993).
72 The Florida code provides:
(1) A development agreement shall include the following:
(a) A legal description of the land subject to the agreement, and the names of its le-
gal and equitable owners;
(b) The duration of the agreement;
(c) The development uses permitted on the land, including population densities, and
building intensities and height;
(d) A description of public facilities that will service the development, including
who shall provide such facilities; the date any new facilities, if needed, will be con-
structed; and a schedule to assure public facilities are available concurrent with the
impacts of the development;
(e) A description of any reservation or dedication of land for public purposes;
(f) A description of all local development permits approved or needed to be ap-
proved for the development of the land;
(g) A finding that the development permitted or proposed is consistent with the local
government's comprehensive plan and land development regulations;
(h) A description of any conditions, terms, restrictions, or other requirements deter-
mined to be necessary by the local government for the public health, safety, or wel-
fare of its citizens; and
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contemplate is the tradeoff of zoning for development-generated pub-
lic infrastructure needs (whether or not, it should be added, such pub-
lic infrastructure needs are generated by the instant development).
This is confirmed by cases upholding cooperative and annexation
agreements,73 low-rent housing for zoning,74 annexation, zoning, and
sewer connections for annexation and annexation fees,75 and redevel-
76opment agreements.
The Hawaii, Florida, Nevada, and California statutes contain
minimum standards for describing the basic character of a proposed
development subject to a development agreement. These include
the size and shape of buildings. In a decision that clearly signals the
extent of flexibility possible in California, a California court of ap-
peals recently upheld a development agreement containing no such
precise standards." According to the court, it was sufficient that the
zoning ordinance contained height and use limitations in the zone
where the proposed project was to be constructed.78
This section clearly indicates the importance of a well-drafted
statute in advancing the legality of the annexation or development
agreement, particularly in the face of a reserved powers/bargaining
(i) A statement indicating that the failure of the agreement to address a particular
permit, condition, term, or restriction shall not relieve the developer of the necessity
of complying with the law governing said permitting requirements, conditions, term,
or restriction.
(2) A development agreement may provide that the entire development or any phase
thereof be commenced or completed within a specific period of time.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3227 (vest 2000).
73 See Housing Redevelopment Auth. v. Jorgensen, 328 N.W.2d 740, 742-43 (Minn.
1983) (holding that cooperation agreement entered into between city and housing and redevel-
opment authority required city to issue conditional use permits for development of low-income
housing project).
7' See Housing Auth. v. City of Los Angeles, 243 P.2d 515, 524 (Cal. 1952) (holding that
city was bound by cooperative agreement with housing authority that approved development
and construction of low-rent housing project).
75 See Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196, 201-02 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1976) (holding that annexation agreements entered into between city and developer that
required city to provide sewage service to planned development were binding and enforceable
against the city); Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park, 288 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ill. 1972) (dismissing
developer's mandamus action for issuance of building permit to build a gasoline station pursu-
ant to annexation agreement, because developer failed to seek enforcement of its rights under
the annexation agreement within a reasonable time after expiration of annexation agreement's
statutory five-year period of validity).
76 See Mayor of Baltimore v. Crane, 352 A.2d 786, 791-92 (Md. 1976) (holding that
where developer conveyed strip of property to city for highway purposes under zoning ordi-
nance that allowed developer's proposed development to contain the same density of dwelling
units as if the land had not been conveyed, the developer acquired vested contractual rights that
were enforceable against the city).
77 See Santa Margarita Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo County Bd. of Super-
visors, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding development agreement that
froze zoning on the proposed development property in exchange for developer's commitment to
submit a specific construction plan in compliance with county land use requirements).
71 See id. at 747.
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away of the police power challenge. Indeed, there is only one sig-
nificant case upholding a development agreement against this and
other challenges without the benefit of such a statute. 9 It is, there-
fore, worth noting what other basic provisions are contained in a
typical development agreement statute. Thirteen states80 presently
have such statutes. The most detailed comes from Hawaii, and so
the citations that follow are primarily to that statute. However, Cali-
fornia remains the state in which the vast majority of development
agreements appear to be negotiated and are in effect.
C. Common Issues and Problems
1. Enabling Ordinance
A preliminary issue is whether an enabling statute is sufficient
to grant local government the authority to enter into development or
annexation agreements. There is some authority for requiring a lo-
cal government to pass an enabling ordinance setting out the details
of development agreement/annexation agreement procedures and
requirements, although this requirement has, so far, been limited to
development agreements rather than annexation agreements. Thus,
the Hawaii,81 California,82 and Florida83 statutes appear to require
79 See Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989).
so See supra note 32.
81 The Hawaii code provides:
General authorization. Any county by ordinance may authorize the executive branch of the
county to enter into a development agreement with any person having a legal or equitable inter-
est in real property, for the development of such property in accordance with this part; provided
that such an ordinance shall:
(1) Establish procedures and requirements for the consideration of development
agreements upon application by or on behalf of persons having a legal or equitable
interest in the property, in accordance with this part;
(2) Designate a county executive agency to administer the agreements after such
agreements become effective;
(3) Include provisions to require the designated agency to conduct a review of com-
pliance with the terms and conditions of the development agreement, on a periodic
basis as established by the development agreement; and
(4) Include provisions establishing reasonable time periods for the review and appeal
of modifications of the development agreement.
Negotiating development agreements. The mayor or the designated agency ap-
pointed to administer development agreements may make such arrangements as may
be necessary or proper to enter into development agreements, including negotiating
and drafting individual development agreements; provided that the county has
adopted an ordinance pursuant to section 46-123.
The final draft of each individual development agreement shall be presented
to the county legislative body for approval or modification prior to execution. To be
binding on the county, a development agreement must be approved by the county
legislative body and executed by the mayor on behalf of the county. County legisla-
tive approval shall be by resolution adopted by a majority of the membership of the
county legislative body.
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 46-123 to -124 (1993).
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that local governments desiring to negotiate development agree-
ments first pass a local resolution or ordinance to that effect. In,
Hawaii, the state legislature has delegated the authority to the
county to enter into development agreements, provided, however,
that the county first passes an enabling ordinance establishing the
procedures that the county executive branch must follow.
While the language of the Hawaii statute does not clearly require
such an ordinance, three out of Hawaii's four counties have drafted
them. According to attorneys in California, those California local
governments that have executed development agreements have also
passed such ordinances. Indeed, the recent amendments to the Cali-
fornia statute-by making it mandatory that local governments pass
such ordinances at the request of landowners to ensure that there is a
process available for negotiating such agreements-appear to make it
very clear that such ordinances are a prerequisite.
2. Approval and Adoption
Although one governmental body may enter into the negotiation
stage of the development agreement, another may be authorized to
approve the final product. In Hawaii, for example, the mayor is the
designated negotiator, with the final agreement presented to the
county legislative body (city council) for approval. If approved, the
city council must then adopt the development agreement by resolu-
tion.84 In California, a development agreement must be approved by
ordinance. In Illinois, an annexation agreement may be approved by
either resolution or ordinance and must be passed by' a vote of two-
thirds of the corporate authorities then holding office.
82 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865(c) (West 1997) ("Every city, county, or city and
county, shall, upon request of an applicant, by resolution or ordinance, establish procedures and
requirements for the consideration of development agreements upon application by, or on behalf
of, the property owner or other person having a legal or equitable interest in the property.").
'3 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3223 (West 2000) ("Any local government may, by ordi-
nance, establish procedures and requirements, as provided in ss. 163.3220-163.3243, to consider
and enter into a development agreement with any person having a legal or equitable interest in
real property located within its jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
The Hawaii code provides:
Negotiating development agreements. The mayor or the designated agency
appointed to administer development agreements may make such arrangements as
may be necessary or proper to enter into development agreements, including negoti-
ating and drafting individual development agreements; provided that the county has
adopted an ordinance pursuant to section 46-123.
The final draft of each individual development agreement shall be presented
to the county legislative body for approval or modification prior to execution. To be
binding on the county, a development agreement must be approved by the county
legislative body and executed by the mayor on behalf of the county. County legisla-
tive approval shall be by resolution adopted by a majority of the membership of the
county legislative body.
HAw. REv. STAT. § 46-124 (1993).
85 The Illinois code provides:
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3. Conformance to Plans
Development and annexation agreements must often comply
with local government plans as a condition of enforceability, either by
statute or because of the rubric that the zoning bargained-for must
accord with comprehensive plans. The Hawaii8o and California 7 de-
velopment agreement statutes both so require. The importance of the
plan is demonstrated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Sprenger, Grubb
& Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey.88 There, the court upheld a re-
zoning over the objections of the developers of property subject to
what the court called a development agreement (arguably an annexa-
tion agreement), on the ground that the applicable plan was suffi-
ciently broad in that it supported the contested downzoning.
89
Largely to the same effect is a recent California court of appeals deci-
sion where the existence of, and need to conform to, applicable plans,
was critical in upholding a development agreement in the face of a
broad and direct challenge to such agreements generally.
90
4. The Legislative/Administrative Issue
One of the thorniest problems in land use regulation is whether
the amendment or changing of such a regulation is legislative or
quasi-judicial/administrative. 91  Legislative decisions like zoning
amendments are subject to initative and referendum, whereas quasi-
judicial decisions like the granting of a special use permit are not.
Legislative decisions like rezonings are, when appealed, usually heard
de novo whereas quasi-judicial decisions, like the granting of a spe-
cial use permit, are decided on the record made before the permitting
The annexation agreement or amendment shall be executed by the mayor or presi-
dent and attested by the clerk of the municipality only after such hearing and upon
the adoption of a resolution or ordinance directing such execution, which resolution
or ordinance must be passed by a vote of two-thirds of the corporate authorities then
holding office.
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-3 (West 1993).
86 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-129 (1993) ("No development agreement shall be entered
into unless the county legislative body finds that the provisions of the proposed development
agreement are consistent with the county's general plan and any applicable development plan,
effective as of the effective date of the development agreement.").
87 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5 (West 1997) ("A development agreement is a legisla-
tive act which shall be approved by ordinance and is subject to referendum. A development
agreement shall not be approved unless the legislative body finds that the provisions of the
agreement are consistent with the general plan and any applicable specific plan.").
88 903 P.2d 741 (Idaho 1995).
89 See id. at 750 ("The Council's conclusion that the 'downzoning' ... is consistent with
Hailey's comprehensive plan is not clearly erroneous, and is affirmed.").
90 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
91 See, e.g., Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 524 P.2d 84, 90-91 (Haw. 1974) (holding a
reclassification of land by a state land use commission to be quasi-judicial); Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (Or. 1973) (holding a rezoning to be the same, despite the
general rule that such "rezonings" are generally held to be legislative in character).
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agency, usually under a state's administrative procedure code.92
What about the development agreement? On this issue, California
and Hawaii appear to differ-in the former, it is a legislative act, 93
whereas it is an administrative act in the latter.
94
As with zoning, what follows from the statutory declarations-
legislative in California, administrative (quasi-judicial?) in Hawaii-
is more than a matter of form. Legislative decisions are subject to
referendum.95 Quasi-judicial ones are not.96 Given the common use
of the referendum in both California and Hawaii to address land use
issues, development agreements in Hawaii, at least, are likely to be
"referendum-proof," as well as protected against government change,
during the life of a development agreement. However, California
limits the opportunity to repeal a development agreement to thirty
days from the date the local government approved the agreement.
Thereafter, both the agreement and the proposed land development
are immune from subsequent changes by referendum.98
Finally, there is the question in California of whether a legisla-
ture can declare something to be a legislative act if it is not one any-
way, even though this might "take away a right reserved in the Cali-
fornia Constitution to the people of a city to rezone by initiative." 99 It
is, according to one commentator, the opinion of a "large Orange
County law firm" that a development agreement is an adjudicative
act, despite the California statutory language. 1°0 This issue does not
arise in Hawaii, both because the state constitution does not so pro-
vide, and because the Hawaii statute expresses a preference against
92 See JuLIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
CONTROL LAW §§ 531,533,538 (1998).
93 See supra note 87.
94 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-131 (1993) ("Each development agreement shall be deemed
an administrative act of the government body made party to the agreement.").
95 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5 (West 1997) ("A development agreement is a legisla-
tive act... and is subject to referendum.").
96 See DAVID L CALLIES & ROBERT H. FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE
309 (1986); DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING
AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 3.12 (1986).
97 See Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 269 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804-06 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that where development agreements are approved by legislative act of resolution
that do not include referendum mechanism, constitutional right to referendum requires thirty-
day delay in effectiveness of the agreement to allow for referendum procedure).
98 See CuRTIN, supra note 57, at 189 ("A development agreement is ... subject to repeal
by referendum. However, the opportunity for such repeal expires 30 days after the city's adop-
tion of... the agreement, and thereafter the project is immune to subsequent changes in zoning
ordinances and land use regulations... inconsistent with those.., in the agreement.").
99 Hagman, supra note 57, at 70.
' See id. (discussing law firm's opinion that raises doubt about propriety of a referendum
if approval of development agreements is adjudicatory rather than legislative, "since the Cali-
fornia Constitution art. IV, § I reserves the referendum right to the people only for legislation
and it would raise major due process problems if the people were allowed to adjudicate").
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such agreements being legislative acts. Other states have decided the
question in the courts alone.101
5. Public Hearing
Another issue arising frequently is whether a public hearing is
required before a development agreement can be entered into, and, if
so, what proceedings are required. Both Hawaii 02 and California'0 3
explicitly require that a public hearing be held prior to adoption of the
development agreement. The Illinois annexation agreement statute
also requires a public hearing. 04
6. Binding of State and Federal Agencies
Hawaii and California diverge on another key point: the binding
inclusion of state or federal agencies. Hawaii seeks to bind them;19
California does not.'0 6 California initially appears to limit agreements
101 See, e.g., Geralnes B.V. v. City of Greenwood Village, 583 F. Supp. 830, 835 (D. Colo.
1984) (holding that city's zoning actions are quasi-judicial).
'02 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-128 (1993) ("No development agreement shall be entered
into unless a public hearing on the application therefor first shall have been held by the county
legislative body.").
103 The California code provides:
A public hearing on an application for a development agreement shall be held by the
planning agency and by the legislative body. Notice of intention to consider adop-
tion of a development agreement shall be given as provided in Section 65090 and
65091 in addition to any other notice required by law for other actions to be consid-
ered concurrently with the development agreement.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867 (West 1997).
104 The Illinois code provides:
Any such agreement executed after July 31, 1963 and all amendments of annexation
agreements, shall be entered into in the following manner. The corporate authorities
shall fix a time for and hold a public hearing upon the proposed annexation agree-
ment or amendment, and shall give notice of the proposed agreement or amendment
not more than 30 nor less than 15 days before the date fixed for the hearing. This
notice shall be published at least once in one or more newspapers published in the
municipality, or, if no newspaper is published therein, then in one or more newspa-
pers with a general circulation within the annexing municipality. After such hearing
the agreement or amendment may be modified before execution thereof. The an-
nexation agreement or amendment shall be executed by the mayor or president and
attested by the clerk of the municipality only after such hearing and upon the adop-
tion of a resolution or ordinance directing such execution, which resolution or ordi-
nance must be passed by a vote of two-thirds of the corporate authorities then hold-
ing office.
65 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-3 (West 1993).
105 The Hawaii code provides:
In addition to the county and principal, any federal, state, or local government
agency or body may be included as a party to the development agreement. If more
than one government body is made party to an agreement, the agreement shall spec-
ify which agency shall be responsible for the overall administration of the agree-
ment.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-126(d) (1993).
106 The California code provides:
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to cities and counties, though it contemplates coastal commissions as
parties under certain circumstances. Hawaii, on the other hand, ap-
pears determined to include state and federal agencies in development
agreements.
7. Amendment or Cancellation of the Agreement
Generally, mutual consent of both parties is needed to amend or
cancel the agreement. 10 7 In Hawaii, if the proposed amendment
would substantially alter the original agreement, a public hearing
must be held."0 '
8. Breach
The successful negotiation and execution of a development
agreement or annexation agreement is generally guided by statute in
those states having the benefit of enabling acts. Of considerably
greater importance is the issue of breach. There are essentially two
kinds of breaches that commonly occur during the period of an
agreement: change in land use rules by local government and failure
to provide a bargained-for facility, dedication, or hook-up by either
party.
a. When Local Government Changes the Land Development Rules
As noted in Part I, the overriding concern of the landowner in
negotiating an annexation or development agreement is the vesting of
development rights or the freezing of land development regulations
during the term of the agreement. Whether these regulations are
changed just prior to the execution of the agreement, and whether the
landowner may need further permits which are not subject to a par-
ticular agreement, raise different, but related, questions. Here, we
A development agreement shall not be applicable to any development project lo-
cated in an area for which a local coastal program is required to be prepared and
certified pursuant to the requirements of Division 20 (commencing with Section
30000) of the Public Resources Code, unless: (1) the required local coastal program
has been certified as required by such provisions prior to the date on which the de-
velopment agreement is entered into, or (2) in the event that the required local
coastal program has not been certified, the California Coastal Commission approves
such development agreement by formal commission action.
CAL GOV'T CODE § 65869 (West 1997).
107 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65868 (West 1997) ("A development agreement may be
amended, or canceled in whole or in part, by mutual consent of the parties to the agreement or
their successors in interest .. "); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-130 (1993) ("A development agree-
ment may be amended or canceled, in whole or in part, by mutual consent of the parties to the
agreement, or their successors in interest").
' See HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-130 (1993) ("[I]f the county determines that a proposed
amendment would substantially alter the original development agreement, a public hearing on
the amendment shall be held by the county legislative body before it consents to the proposed
amendment.").
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deal only with the effect on the landowner and the agreement should
the local government change development regulations during the term
of the agreement. Both development agreement and annexation
agreement statutes usually contemplate such a freeze.109
Thus, the California Supreme Court, in City of West Hollywood
v. Beverly Towers, °10 made it abundantly clear in a footnote that land-
owner protection from development regulation changes is a major
factor in executing development agreements:
Development agreements... between a developer and a
local government limit the power of that government to apply
newly enacted ordinances to ongoing developments. Unless
otherwise provided in the agreement, the rules, regulations,
and official policies governing permitted uses, density, de-
sign, improvement, and construction are those in effect when
the agreement is executed. 1
The purpose of a development agreement, said the court, was "to
allow a developer who needs additional discretionary approvals to
complete a long-term development project as approved, regardless of
any intervening changes in local regulations.' ' 12'
The few courts that have dealt with local government changes in
land use regulations have had no difficulty in finding them inapplica-
ble to the property subject to the agreement, provided the agreement
itself is binding. Thus, in Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park,"3 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the original zoning of the subject
property was valid during the term of the annexation agreement and
109 For example, the California code provides:
Unless otherwise provided by the development agreement, rules, regulations, and of-
ficial policies governing permitted uses of the land, governing density, and govern-
ing design, improvement, and construction standards and specifications, applicable
to development of the property subject to a development agreement, shall be those
rules, regulations, and official policies in force at the time of execution of the
agreement. A development agreement shall not prevent a city, county, or city and
county, in subsequent actions applicable to the property, from applying new rules,
regulations, and policies which do not conflict with those rules, regulations, and
policies applicable to the property as set forth herein, nor shall a development
agreement prevent a city, county, or city and county from denying or conditionally
approving any subsequent development project application on the basis of such ex-
isting or new rules, regulations, and policies.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65866 (West 1997).
"10 805 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1991).
.. Id. at 334 n.6. See also Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., Protecting Developers' Permits to Build:
Development Agreement in Practice in California and Other States, 18 ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP. 85, 85-92 (1995) (discussing various tests for determining when a developer's rights have
vested and local government is estopped "from enacting or applying subsequent zoning changes
to prevent the completion of the project or substantially reduce the return upon the developer's
investment").
112 Beverly Towers, 805 P.2d at 334-35.
113 288 N.E.2d 423 (11. 1972).
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any change by the Village was void during that time. Indeed, since
the Village's attempted zoninh change was void, said the court, there
was no breach by the Village.
However, Illinois courts have also held that the expiration of an
annexation agreement results in the expiration of whatever zoning
classification the landowner had bargained for in the agreement. In
Bank of Waukegan v. Village of Vernon Hills,"5 the landowner sued
for the benefits of a zoning classification and special use permit
passed and granted under an expired annexation agreement. The
court held that the zoning and permits that were enacted the same day
as the expired agreement "were provisions of the annexation agree-
ment," and thus only enforceable "during the life of the annexation
agreement."" 6 The court concluded that any other result would evade
the term limits of annexation agreements as set out in the applicable
statute. It is not clear how a legislative act of a local government can
be so automatically terminated by the expiration of an agreement.
Surely the inapplicability of zoning changes in the Meegan case, due
to the shield provided by the annexation agreement, does not lead to
the broad conclusion that any zoning resulting from such an agree-
ment terminates when the agreement does. In attempting to address
the inherent problems created by the Bank of Waukegan decision, the
Illinois General Assembly adopted the following amendatory lan-
guage in 1995:
After the effective term of any annexation agreement
and unless otherwise provided for within the annexation
agreement or an amendment to the annexation agreement, the
provisions of any ordinance relating to the zoning of the land
that is provided for within the agreement or an amendment to
the agreement, shall remain in effect unless modified in ac-
cordance with law. This amendatory Act of 1995 is declara-
tive of existing law and shall apply to all annexation agree-
ments.
117
On the other hand, careful drafting is necessary to avoid the later
application of land development regulations of a different sort than
those contemplated in the agreement. Thus, in the California case of
Pardee Construction Co. v. City of Camarillo,'8 the court held appli-
14 See id. at 426; cf Cummings v. City of Waterloo, 683 N.E.2d 1222, 1230 (111. App. Ct.
1997) (holding the city's amendment to its zoning ordinance that was contrary to the provisions
of an annexation agreement was unenforceable against property subject to the annexation
agreement).
"s 626 N.E.2d 245 (I11, App. Ct. 1993).
1:6 Id at 249 (emphasis omitted).
" 65 ILL. COip. STAT. ANN. 5/11-15.1-2 (West Supp. 2000).
"' 690 P.2d701 (Cal. 1984).
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cable to the subject property a transportation impact fee on the ground
that it was different from the land development regulations listed in
the agreement as frozen. While this seems to require a certain amount
of prescience from the landowner at first blush, a local government
can hardly be estopped from exercising its police power in enforcing
a new breed of land development regulations that were not contem-
plated years before by either party, under the exercise of its police
power. Country Meadows West Partnership v. Village of
Germantown'19 represents an entirely different perspective where the
court struck down the Village's imposition of a new impact fee
against a subdivider, holding that because a subdivision agreement
between the Village and the subdivider was approved prior to the en-
actment of the impact fee ordinance, the subdivider was not obligated
to pay the impact fee.
While most development agreement and some annexation
agreement statutes either contain a limitation on the duration of such
120 .121agreements, or provide that the agreement must recite one, many
states appear to permit annexation agreements (and some states like
Nebraska, development agreements) without the benefit of a statute.
It is, therefore, theoretically possible for an annexation agreement to
be relatively open-ended with respect to matters such as the zoning of
the subject property. The results can be unfortunate for the land-
owner since it is, of course, black letter law that a landowner has no
vested right in a zoning classification absent activity which vests such
rights. 122 Thus, where the agreement is silent on the time period, at
least one court has held that a landowner is without remedy if, a few
years after annexation pursuant to an annexation agreement, the an-
nexing local government changes the zoning to a classification which
makes the originally contemplated land development impossible.
1 23
"' 614 N.W.2d 498 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
120 See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5111-15.1-1 (West 1993) ("The agreement shall be
valid and binding for a period of not to exceed 20 years from the date of its execution."); id
5/11-15.1-5 ("Any annexation agreement executed prior to October 1, 1973 ... is hereby de-
clared valid and enforceable as to such provisions for the effective period of such agreement, or
for 20 years from the date of execution thereof, whichever is shorter.").
121 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65865.2 (West 1997) ("A development agreement shall
specify the duration of the agreement ...."); HAW. REv. STAT. § 46-126 (1993) ("A develop-
ment agreement shall ... (4) Provide a termination date .... ").
'22 See David L. Callies, Land Use: Herein of Vested Rights, Plans, and the Relationship of
Planning and Controls, 2 U. HAW. L. REv. 167, 168 (1979) ("While it is fair to say that most
jurisdictions are satisfied with an expenditure of funds in reliance upon a preexisting zone clas-
sification to support a claim for these so-called vested rights, some jurisdictions have disre-
garded all together fairly large amounts so expended.") (footnote omitted).
12 See Carty v. City of Ojai, 143 Cal. Rptr. 506, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) ("he reliance
of the Cartys on the conduct of the city in the case before us has most tenuous predicates. No
representations were made by any public official from the city as to the length of the time that
the zone "C-i" would continue.").
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b. Nonperformance of a Bargained-For Act: Dedications,
Contributions, and Hook-ups
Equally common is the failure of a landowner or local govern-
ment to live up to the other terms of the agreement, generally by fail-
ing to provide a public facility or money therefor, or by refusing to
provide utility services to the subject property.124 Under such circum-
stances, the courts have been strict in forcing the parties to live up to
their bargains, even when unusual difficulties would appear to render
such performance nearly impossible. Thus, in the California case of
Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, the court of appeals
directed the local government to provide sewer connections to the
landowner's property, as agreed in an annexation agreement, even
though a superior governmental entity, a state regional water quality
control board, ordered the local government not to do so.2 5 After
deciding that the agreement did not amount to the city's illegally
contracting away its police power, the court stated: "The onset of
materially changed conditions is not a ground for voiding a municipal
contract which was valid when made, nor is the contracting city's
failure to have foreseen them."
126
In much the same vein, the Colorado Supreme Court refused a
landowner's request that roughly $25,000 in payments to a local gov-
ernment for acquisition of parks, playgrounds, and schools be re-
turned on the ground that the annexation agreement requiring such
payment was ultra vires.127 The court stated:
The plaintiff wanted water and sewer services; the City
required annexation and a sum of money equal to eight per
cent of the appraised value of the property. Each got what it
bargained for.... We see no reason, legal or moral, why the
plaintiff should have all of the benefits of its bargain by
which it obtained the water and sewer services it needed in
order to carry out its plans, and yet receive back from the
City a portion of the consideration which it gave in order to
obtain these services ....12s
124 For other items bargained for and litigated, see Van Cleave v. Village of Seneca, 519
N.E.2d 63, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (exemptions from real estate taxes), and O'Malley v. Village
of Ford Heights, 633 N.E.2d 848, 849 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) (exemption from environmental
ordinances, which did not survive legal challenge).
"' 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Cal Ct. App. 1976); but cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987) (upholding governmental refusal to perform develop-
ment agreement when health and safety issue is involved); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590,593-94 (1962) (same).
126 Morrison Homes Corp., 130 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
127 See City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 392 P.2d 467,473 (Colo. 1964).
'8 Id. at 472.
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Of course, as intimated in the foregoing case, the agreement it-
self must be binding. Thus, in Village of Lisle v. Outdoor Advertising
Co.,129 an Illinois appellate court refused to enforce a local govern-
ment ordinance banning certain signs and billboards on the property
subject to an annexation agreement on the ground that the property
was not contiguous to the village and, therefore, the annexation
agreement was invalid and unenforceable.
D. Limits on Local Government Conditions, Exactions, and
Dedications Pursuant to Annexation and Development Agreements
While every governmental action must be invested with a public
purpose, there are few conditions, exactions, or dedications that a lo-
cal government may not legitimately bargain for in negotiating such
agreements. Certainly, local governments may require landowners
and developers to make reasonable contributions toward whatever
services and other resources the government will need to provide as a
result of an annexation or development. 30 But this is so under exist-
ing law on develogment conditions and exactions entirely apart from
such agreements. I The question is whether the local government
may go further since the development or annexation agreement is in-
deed a voluntary agreement which neither government nor landowner
is compelled to either negotiate or execute. So long as the agreement
is indeed voluntary, the answer is almost certainly yes.' 32 Perhaps the
best judicial support for this proposition comes from the Colorado
129 544 N.E.2d 836 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
130 See, e.g., Village of Orland Park v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 481 N.E.2d 946, 950
(I1. App. Ct. 1985) ("Additional positive effects of such agreements include controls over
health, sanitation, fire prevention and police protection, which are vital to governing communi-
ties.").
31 See David L. Callies, Exactions, Impact Fees and Other Land Development Conditions,
in ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS ch. 9 (Eric Damian Kelly ed., 2001); see also Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment requires that "the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the re-
quired dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment"); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) ("We have long
recognized that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it substantially advances legiti-
mate state interests and does not deny an owner economically viable use of his land .... [A]
broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements.") (internal
quotations omitted).
132 See City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1025 (Md. 2000) (conditions
agreed to by the subdivider as part of an earlier subdivision agreement were not an unconstitu-
tional taking of the subdivider's property). For a contrary view which would impose the same
strict nexus and proportionality requirements upon such agreements as upon "freestanding"
local government development dedications, exactions, and other conditions, see generally Sam
D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan, Land-use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Condi-
tional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 LAND & WATER L. REv. 415 (1995).
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Supreme Court.133 In upholding the levying of a fee as a condition of
annexation under an annexation agreement, the court held:
A municipality is under no legal obligation in the first
instance to annex contiguous territory, and may reject a peti-
tion for annexation for no reason at all. It follows then that if
the municipality elects to accept such territory solely as a
matter of its discretion, it may impose such conditions by
way of agreement as it sees fit. If the party seeking annexa-
tion does not wish to annex under the conditions imposed, he
is free to withdraw his petition to annex and remain without
the city.1
34
State development agreement legislation enables local govern-
ments to enact ordinances providing for development agreements. A
fundamental inquiry in determining the legal validity of traditional
exaction ordinances concerns the purposes to which the exaction will
be put and the relationship of the exaction to the need created by the
development. A discussion of the "rational nexus" standard follows,
but a collateral issue is raised when determining the municipal
authority to extract exactions pursuant to a development agreement.
Courts have developed the "reasonable relationship,' 35 "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable,"' 136 and "essential nexus'' 137 tests to
determine the constitutionality of development exactions. These tests
were originally formulated to assess the validity of on-site develop-
ment exactions. These same tests, however, have been applied to off-
site impact fees, are likely to be applied to linkage regulations, and
may be relied upon to challenge development agreements. While off-
site impact fees and linkage regulations are used to fund improve-
ments necessitated by development in the region as a whole, rather
than for needs more directly attributable to the new development, de-
velopment agreements seeking to extract funds for tenuously related
off-site benefits are sufficiently analogous to invite challenge under
the same standards. 38  Whether or not development agreements suc-
133 See City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Development Co., 392 P.2d 467, 472
(Colo. 1964) (holding that the municipality may impose conditions upon an annexation agree-
ment because the action is "purely contractual").
134 Id.; accord Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, No. 98-56097, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3196
(9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' claim seeking connection of their
residential care facility to sewer system of City of Claremont, because plaintiffs failed to show
that they had a right not to have their land annexed as required by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994)).
' Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383.
13 Northern Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389 (111.
1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
137 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 837 (1987).
138 See John J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to "Let's
Make a Deal", 25 URB. LAw. 49, 67 (1993) (noting that courts may be receptive to challenges
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cessfully avoid or survive such challenges may depend upon how
willing the courts are to accept a return to the underlying "voluntary"
rationale.
The argument has been made that exactions agreed to under a
voluntary development agreement must bear a rational nexus to the
needs created by the development. 139 The argument states that the
"rational nexus" and "substantial advancement" standards of Nollan
are not limited to just those instances where the municipality requires
an exaction from an uncooperative landowner, but also apply to vol-
untary permit conditions. Under this view, the type and extent of ex-
actions permissible under development agreements would not differ
from the type and extent available under other traditional exaction
mechanisms such as impact fees.
The rationale supporting such a view is that requiring the Nollan
standard to be satisfied serves to prevent governmental abuse of the
mechanism, as it is "difficult to tell whether a landowner's acceptance
of a condition is truly voluntary or is instead a submission to govern-
ment coercion."' 140 Thus:
A municipality could use.., regulations to exact land or
fees from a subdivider far out of proportion to the needs cre-
ated by his subdivision in order to avoid imposing the burden
of paying for additional services on all citizens via taxation.
To tolerate this situation would be to allow an otherwise ac-
ceptable exercise of police power to become grand theft.
141
The Hawaii development agreement statute provides that, "Pub-
lic benefits derived from development agreements may include, but
are not limited to, affordable housing, design standards, and on- and
off-site infrastructure and other improvements. Such benefits may be
to expenditures that are remote); Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle
of Exactions: From Dedication to Linkage, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1987, at 69, 82
(concluding that even if Boston's linkage exactions are viewed as regulatory fees, they are vul-
nerable to being invalidated as not reasonably related to needs created by the regulated devel-
opment).
139 See Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAw. 23, 27 (1990) ("In applying this standard,
courts considered ... the cost of existing public facilities and their manner of financing, the
extent to which existing development has already contributed to the cost of these facilities, and
the extent to which the proposed project will contribute to the cost of the existing facilities in the
future.").
'40 Id. at 46.
141 Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976) (upholding statute
authorizing municipalities to require dedication of land or payment of fees as condition of sub-
division approval as constitutional since enabling legislation and implementing ordinance lim-
ited the amount of land to be dedicated to a "reasonable" percentage of the property).
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negotiated for in return for the vesting of development fights for a
specific period."1 42 According to one commentator:
[The government can require the developer to provide public
benefits unrelated to the proposed project in exchange for the
municipality granting her the right to develop. . . . [Ihe
statute leads municipalities to believe that the granting of de-
velopment rights confers a governmental benefit on the de-
veloper. This is not the case. Nollan clearly holds that "the
fight to build on one's own property--even though its exer-
cise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-
cannot remotely be described as a "'governmental benefit."' 43
However, while it is true that the right to develop on one's own
land is not a governmental benefit, the right to develop is not the bar-
gaining chip being tendered by the government in a development
agreement. The authorities cited in support of the above-quoted ar-
gument concern exactions imposed as required conditions to devel-
opment. In the case of a development agreement, the municipality is
not granting the landowner the right to develop nor imposing condi-
tions on such development, but instead is promising to protect the
developer's investment by not enforcing any subsequent land use
regulation that may burden the project. The developer does not re-
quire any such guarantee to exercise his right or privilege to build,
and may certainly choose to proceed without it. To the extent that the
developer chooses to avail himself of such a guarantee and to negoti-
ate for it, it could be argued that the development agreement does in-
deed convey a "governmental benefit" upon the developer, since "[i]t
is well established that there is no federal Constitutional right to be
free from changes in land use laws."144 The municipality should
therefore be free to negotiate its best terms in exchange for the benefit
conferred, regardless of nexus.
CONCLUSION
Although the popularity of development agreements has in-
creased considerably in recent years, case law in this area is relatively
sparse. The most significant issues addressed by recent courts center
around whether a local government has the authority to enter into
such an agreement and, if so, what terms and conditions are permissi-
ble and constitutional. Development agreements are attractive to both
142 HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-121 (1993).
143 Crew, supra note 139, at 49 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
826,833 (1987)).
14 Lakeview Dev. Corp. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir.
1990).
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sides of the development equation. On the one hand, a developer can
achieve a freeze on development regulations and, in some cases, fees
and contributions. A local government, on the other hand, can obtain
"voluntary" contributions, dedications, and the developer's agreement
to construct public improvements without having to establish any
"nexus" between the required improvement or exaction and the pro-
posed development. Provided that the parties entering into the devel-
opment agreement comply with any applicable statutory procedures,
and the terms and conditions of the agreement are not overreaching, a
development agreement can be a valuable tool in the development
process.
